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Abstract 
There are several applications in which it would be useful to have the capability to 
generate a particular number that would be specific to a certain piece of hardware.  One 
application is the key for an encryption algorithm.  If a program could be written to 
produce a unique value for a device, based on its intrinsic properties, this value could be 
used as an uncloneable key for an encryption algorithm.  Currently, there are ways to use 
the delay characteristics of transistors to create a unique identity for a device.  This 
research examines a way to modify one of these existing methods to instead generate an 
uncloneable key specific to a particular device.   
A key is made up of a series of binary digits.  In order to generate a specific key, 
there must be a way to control whether each bit of the key will be a „0‟ or a „1‟.  
Theoretically, it should be possible to add buffers into a circuit path to increase the 
propagation delay through a simple combinational circuit composed of logic gates, which 
could produce either a glitch of „0‟ or a „1‟ on its output.  Each bit of the key is an output 
of one of these simple glitch circuits.  The addition of buffers must be selectable to be 
able to control the amount of buffers added into the path for each bit. 
The results detail tests of two configurations for adding a selectable amount of 
buffers into each glitch circuit in order to induce additional delay.  One configuration, the 
linear selection design, adds up to seven buffers that is equivalent to the binary digits 
used on the three SELECT lines of a multiplexer.  The linear selection implementation 
v 
produces 30.94% unusable output lines, where a unusable line is defined as one that does 
not have at least one „1‟ and one „0‟ glitch count in response to every buffer count. 
The second implementation of buffer selection, referred to as the cascaded design, 
has eight different quantities of selectable buffers, but they all connect to one multiplexer.  
Each successive line connects to the previous line and adds a certain number of buffers.  
The cascaded design generates an average of 53.75% unusable output lines. 
 Tests were also performed to determine the optimal number of buffers added to 
each output using the linear buffer selection configuration.  Using three input bits to the 
buffer unit produced 30.94% unusable outputs.  Four bits generated nearly 25% more 
usable outputs, while the use of six bits gave less than a 5% improvement over four bits.   
After determining the optimal configuration for controlling the output lines, the 
user profiles the circuit to deduce the value of the output lines for each number of 
selectable buffers added to the circuit.  The user can then use this information to generate 
a specific glitch count on each output line, which is passed to an Advanced Encryption 
Standard algorithm as its key.  This research uses a 128-bit key; however, it can be easily 
modified to produce a 192-bit or 256-bit key. 
The average repeatability of the glitch count is 94.85% using this method.  The 
overall distinguishability of the generated glitch counts for each output line is 10.46%.  
vi 
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UTILIZING THE DIGITAL FINGERPRINT METHODOLOGY FOR SECURE KEY 
GENERATION 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Research Motivation 
One way to implement user-specified hardware is to use a Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) because they avoid the upfront costs associated with Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) [1].  However, the vulnerability of an FPGA to 
enemy attack is becoming apparent, as demonstrated by Standaert el al., in their results of 
power analysis attacks on FPGAs [2].  Previous research in this area has proven the 
validity of the digital fingerprint, but has fallen short in showing the practicality of this 
method.  The motivation for coming up with a method to generate an encryption key 
using the unique, intrinsic characteristics of an FPGA is to provide more security for 
digitally stored data.  To defeat the proposed method an adversary would need the user‟s 
password, the same FPGA used to generate the key, and the software program that was 
run on the FPGA. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
In order to generate a secure key, a random number or password must be provided 
to the encryption algorithm.  Previous research by Capt Hiren Patel found that due to the 
random variations in the delays of transistors, FPGA‟s can be individually identifiable 
[3].  This “digital fingerprint” takes advantage of the slight variations in the 
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characteristics of transistors, which introduces variations in the delay of the signal, 
causing glitches on the output of a gate or circuit.   
By modifying the existing digital fingerprinting method, created by Crouch and 
improved by Patel, to produce either a zero or a one on each of its output lines, a user can 
specify which output line to use for each bit of the key.  Since Patel‟s work typically 
produced glitches of between zero and eight on each output line using a 32-by-32 bit 
multiplier, a simpler combinational circuit is used for the intermediate circuitry for this 
application.  This method investigates the use of a very simplistic NAND gate 
implementation with a programmable number of buffers added to the path to provide a 
greater variation in the number of glitches. 
1.3. Goals 
The first objective is to describe a combinational circuit in VHSIC Hardware 
Description Language (VHDL) that generates either none or one glitch.  This will 
establish a binary decision, either a „0‟ or „1‟, occurring on the output of such a circuit.  
The zeros and ones should occur randomly on the output. 
The second goal of this research effort is to generate a user-specified key to the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.  Accomplishing the first goal will 
provide the user with the ability to choose whether each output line will produce a „0‟ or 
a „1‟ glitch count, enabling the user to specify a key. 
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1.4. Overview 
The following chapters detail the investigation of using the digital fingerprinting 
method to generate a secure key for the AES encryption algorithm.  Chapter 2 provides 
the background information on circuit identification techniques and the existing digital 
fingerprinting method.  In Chapter 3, the methodology of this research is presented.  This 
chapter also addresses the modifications made to the original Digital Fingerprinting 
method, and also some of the problems that were encountered and why they occurred.  
Chapter 4 discusses the results and the analysis of the data collected.  Conclusions 
reached by this research effort are included in Chapter 5, along with possible ways to 
improve upon the key generation technique described herein.  
4 
II. Background 
The following chapter presents background information relating to the generation 
of unique circuit identifiers.   In order to comprehend circuit identification, it is essential 
to first understand why and how Integrated Circuits (ICs) of the same type can be 
distinguished from one another.  The next section discusses the Physical Uncloneable 
Function (PUF) concept, and some of its implementations.  The last section of this 
chapter covers the original Digital Fingerprinting method and the modifications to this 
method that are necessary to create an uncloneable key for an encryption algorithm. 
2.1. Physical Variations Among Integrated Circuits 
Although a particular IC may be fabricated using the same mask, slight 
dissimilarities will exist between each and every one of the circuits produced by that 
mask [4], [5]. The actual product of an IC manufacturing process is different from the 
idealized models we use to represent them due to the non-ideal methods by which the 
circuits are created.  The idealized model of a transistor is represented in Figure 1.  Figure 
2 shows a picture of an actual transistor manufactured by Intel.  Other research by 
Agarwal et al in [6] even suggests that variations in the characteristics are spatially 
correlated. 
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Figure 1:  Ideal Model of a Transistor [3] 
 
Figure 2:  Actual Transistor [3] 
There are many layers and junctions that compose an IC.  Each process by which 
these layers and junctions are formed introduces the capacity for miniscule fluctuations to 
occur between actual devices, [7-9].  For example, ion implantation is used to form 
junctions in semiconductors.  Ion implantation is a method of impurity doping where ions 
are accelerated toward a substrate through a patterned mask. The result is a doped region 
of scattered ions. Because the collisions are random, the final positions of the dopant 
atoms can only be estimated by a Gaussian distribution function [7]. There are also a 
small percentage of ions that tunnel through the silicon dioxide causing additional 
negligible disfigurements in the substrate.   
Every process at every level of IC fabrication introduces a very small amount of 
error and the distribution of random allowable abnormalities that do not affect the overall 
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function of the circuit. Researchers have taken advantage of these differences in 
developing efficient methods of circuit identification and encryption. 
2.2. Physical Unclonable Functions 
2.2.1. Overview 
As technology continues to advance and become more and more a part of our daily 
life, so does the need for increased data security. Not only does the data need to be 
protected, but it also must be implemented in a way that is fast, reliable, small, and 
economical. With all of these limitations it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide 
this safeguard to consumers through conventional methods. Various researchers in [3-4, 
10-13] have developed an innovative approach to Identity (ID) verification that takes 
advantage of the random physical variations in integrated circuits.   
2.2.2. Arbiter PUF 
2.2.1 Arbiter PUF Description 
Figure 3 represents the arbiter PUF circuitry designed by Suh and Devadas [4]. The 
D latch (arbiter) determines the single bit output, Y, of the circuit based on signals that 
arrive on its inputs first.  The delay paths that feed into the latch are comprised of pairs of 
multiplexers.  Each i
th
 pair is controlled by X[i].  If X[i] = 0, the signal will continue on 
the same path.  Otherwise, if X[i] = 1, the signals will exchange paths.   
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Figure 3:  Arbiter PUF Circuit [4] 
 
Because each multiplexer has a slightly different delay induced by the 
manufacturing process, the circuit will perform differently based on unique combinations 
of the input bits. 
2.2.2 Arbiter PUF Reliability 
The results of Suh and Devadas‟s experiments on the arbiter PUF circuit showed 
that when the arbiter circuit output was measured for the same chip, the output was only 
different 0.7% of the time, which suggests that a measurement based on the unique delays 
of a circuit is a valuable and reliable quantity [4]. 
There was a 23% chance of identical arbiter circuits on separate chips having 
different outputs given the same input.  Suh and Devada pointed out that this low 
percentage was the result of not laying out their circuit symmetrically as it appears in the 
idealized illustration of Figure 3. If a truly symmetrical design is actualized, they claim 
that the inter-chip variation would approximately double. 
The most reassuring aspect of the experiments conducted by Suh and Devadas is 
that the PUF circuitry is reliable when it comes to environmental stresses.  The output 
noise stayed under 10% even when the circuit was faced with extreme operating 
temperatures of 100°C and a 33% voltage variance. 
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2.2.3. Ring Oscillator PUF 
2.2.3.1 Ring Oscillator PUF Description 
A ring oscillator PUF is shown in Figure 4 [4]. The circuit is composed of N 
oscillators, each of which oscillates at a different frequency due to the variations inherent 
in the manufacturing process as described in Section 2.2.  The output of the circuit is a 
„1‟ if the frequency of the top signal is faster than the bottom frequency, and „0‟ 
otherwise.  The output of these oscillators is fed into one of two multiplexers.  The 
multiplexer selects frequencies to compare based on the control input. 
The ring oscillator PUF is capable of producing up to log2(N!) independent output 
bits.  
Figure 4:  Ring Oscillator PUF Circuit [4] 
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2.2.3.2 Ring Oscillator PUF Reliability 
It is important to ensure the oscillator comparisons are conducted between 
oscillators whose frequencies are not similar. These oscillators are very susceptible to 
changes in temperature, operating voltage, and other environmental factors. If an 
oscillator is subjected to extreme conditions and it is compared with an oscillator whose 
frequency is not far from its own, an erroneous output bit may result. 
2.2.4. Butterfly PUF 
2.2.4.1 Butterfly PUF Description 
The details of the Butterfly PUF circuit are rendered in Figure 5 [5]. The Butterfly 
PUF is implemented in an FPGA by cross-coupling a pair of D latches.  This 
configuration allows an input signal to excite the circuit, which in turn allows the circuit 
to transition from an unstable state to a stable state over time.  This PUF derivative is for 
use on FPGAs, where the previous designs fall short.  Upon excitation by an input signal, 
the circuit will enter an unstable state, where it will stay for a short period of time (on the 
order of picoseconds) before settling into a stable state.  The circuit‟s natural stable state 
may be a high or a low value depending on the slightly different delays on the connecting 
wires, brought about by the random variations experienced during the fabrication of the 
device.  
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Figure 5:  Butterfly PUF Circuit [5] 
 
2.2.4.2 Butterfly PUF Reliability 
Experiments conducted by Kumar et al. [5] deduce a clear separation between the 
within-class Hamming distance and the between-class Hamming distance.  The within-
class Hamming distance is the number of outputs that are different on the same device 
over multiple samples.  The between-class Hamming distance is the number of outputs 
that are unique when comparing different devices.  They also proved the ability to 
reproduce the same results under various environmental conditions.  Among the 
conditions tested were temperature (-20°C to 80°C), operating voltage (not specified), 
and operating frequency (50 MHz to 120 MHz). 
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2.2.5. PUF Conclusion 
The introduction of the PUF concept has revolutionized the realm of data security 
and cryptography. Varying levels of security have been accomplished using this single 
idea, depending on the particular implementation of the PUF. The full potential of PUFs 
has not yet been realized. Continuing research in this area is critical to developing this 
technology to its full potential. Future efforts should explore the ability to digitally 
fingerprint a standalone circuit and the effects of temperature, voltage, and radiation on 
that fingerprint. It is not yet known whether tampering can be sensed based solely upon 
the fingerprint of a circuit or not, although if confirmed, this could prove to be one of the 
most important ramifications that PUFs develop on matters related to national security. 
2.3. Digital Fingerprint Background 
The Digital Fingerprinting methodology was originally introduced by Crouch [14], 
and was improved by Patel [3].  The method is comprised of three main components, 
input generation, combinational circuit, and glitch capture.   
Each of the 64 input bits of the combinational circuit is taken from a Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).  The seed value of the LFSR is hard coded in the 
glitch_counter_setup.vhd file.  The LFSR produces a pseudo-random bit pattern that is 
fed directly to the inputs of the combinational circuit.  The combinational circuit that is 
implemented in the design is a 32-by-32-bit multiplier.  Each output of the multiplier is 
connected to the clock line of a 16-bit one-hot-state shift register, which captures the 
glitches produced by the multiplier.  The one-hot-state shift registers are initialized to 
hold a „1‟ in the least significant bit position.  When a glitch appears, the „1‟ shifts one 
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position toward the most significant bit position.  The final position of the „1‟ in the 
register reveals the total number of glitches that occurred on the output line. 
2.4. Cryptographic Algorithms [15] 
2.4.1. Data Encryption Standard 
DES was created as a result of a request to the general public, made by the United 
States government in 1976, for a standard cryptographic algorithm.  The algorithm is a 
block cipher, which means that it partitions the message, or plaintext, into 64-bit blocks 
and encrypts each block before transmission.  The key is a string of 64 bits; however, 
only 56 bits are used by the algorithm because every eighth bit is purely a parity bit.   
The DES algorithm is executed by using three distinct stages, depicted in Figure 6.  
Stage one rearranges the initial bits of the message, m, into the initial permutation, m0.  
The first 32 bits of m0 is called L0, and the second block of 32 bits is termed R0.  
Each round of the second stage uses a 48-bit string of bits from the key, called Ki.   
The following mathematical operations on rounds 1 through 16: 
Li = Ri-1 
Ri  = L i-1 + f(Ri-1, Ki) 
The function f expands and permutes R into a 4 x 12 matrix of 48 bit values, and stores it 
as E(R).  The result of E(R) exclusive-OR Ki is split into eight 6-bit partitions that are 
each fed into their own S-box.  The output of the S-box is a 4-digit binary number whose 
ith iteration is Ci.  The Ci values are permuted once more to obtain the 32-bit result of the 
function f.   
13 
The final stage of DES swaps the position of L16 and R16 and applies the inverse 
of the initial permutation, which results in the ciphertext, c. 
 
Figure 6:  DES Algorithm 
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2.4.2. Advanced Encryption Standard 
AES was also the result of a government call to the public for a standard, but this 
time it was for an algorithm capable of utilizing keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.  There are 
ten rounds of four steps, or layers, which compose the AES algorithm.  The initial input 
bits to the algorithm are divided into a 4 x 4 matrix of 16 distinct bytes.  A byte is 8 bits. 
 The first layer is the ByteSub Transformation.  This layer permutes the input bits 
by changing their position in what is called an S-box.  The output is a 4 x 4 matrix. 
 The second layer, the ShiftRow Transformation, keeps the first row of the input 
matrix the same.  The second row of the matrix is circularly shifted left by one position.  
The third row is shifted by two, and the fourth row is shifted by three positions, in a 
circular manner. 
MixColumn Transformation is the third layer.  Each column of the output of the 
previous step is multiplied by a known, invertible matrix, shown in Figure 8 on the 
following page. 
The AddRoundKey step is the final layer.  This layer does an exclusive-OR 
operation on the round key and the output of the MixColumn Transformation step.  The 
initial key is broken up into bytes and distributed into a 4 x 4 matrix, where each column 
is named W(0), W(1), W(2), and W(3), respectively.  Each round expands the original 
matrix by four more columns.  The round key for the ith round is a 4 x 4 matrix with the 
columns W(4i), W(4i + 1), W(4i + 2), and W(4i + 3). 
15 
 
Figure 7:  AES Algorithm 
 
Figure 8:  MixColumn Transformation Matrix 
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2.5. Background Summary 
The variance of transistor characteristics in IC‟s was presented in this chapter, as it 
relates to generating glitches.  The PUF concept and some of its implementations were 
examined.  Finally, the Digital Fingerprint Method, designed by Capt Patel, was outlined.  
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III. Methodology 
3.1. Goals and Hypothesis 
The first goal of this research is to design a circuit that will generate a stable glitch 
count on each output line of either „0‟ or „1‟ on each iteration.  This research will build 
upon the existing digital fingerprinting method implemented by Patel.  The intermediate 
circuit is to be modified in such a way as to induce either no glitches or one glitch on 
each output line.  Theoretically, the best way to do this is to describe a very simplistic 
circuit in VHDL that consists of NAND gates with two levels of logic.  In order to 
stimulate a glitch to appear on the output, a selectable amount of buffers should be added 
in between the two levels of logic.  Logically, the more buffers that are added to the line, 
the higher the glitch count should be on the output.                                                 
Once the glitch count on each output line is either a zero or a one, and therefore a 
binary decision, the second goal is to make the buffer count of each intermediate circuit 
(each corresponding to one output line) selectable by a user.  This enables the user to 
generate a key that is unique to the FPGA on which it is being generated.  The user-
specified key will then be used to encrypt plaintext using AES encryption.  This ensures 
that an adversary would have to have the key, the exact FPGA that generated the original 
key, and the software used to generate and capture the key to be able to reproduce the 
same key. 
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3.2. Approach 
3.2.1. Theory 
The first step in producing an uncloneable key is to come up with a way to produce 
between zero and one glitch on an output line.  A glitch can occur on the output of a logic 
gate when the inputs to the gate cause its output to change.  The output does not change 
immediately; it requires a small delay, on the order of picoseconds, to process the change, 
depending on the unique delay characteristics of the transistors used in the logic gate.  
The momentary false value appearing on the output when the inputs cause the output to 
change is called a glitch.  A simple example of a glitch is illustrated in Figure 9.  The 
AND gate on the top is the initial condition with inputs 0 and 1 and an output of 0.  The 
middle gate shows how the output of the AND gate is still 0 after the second input 
changes to a 1 at 5ns.  The bottom AND gate shows the correct output after it has had 
time to process the change in inputs. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Simple Example of a Glitch Occurring on an AND Gate 
These glitches will make up the bits of the key used in an encryption algorithm.  To 
simplify the glitch generation concept used in the original digital fingerprinting method, 
it makes sense to make the glitch circuit as simple as possible.  The proposed idea is a 
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two level logic circuit using three input terms.  The Karnaugh map is shown in Figure 10, 
and the circuit is illustrated in Figure 11.  It is theorized that adding buffers to one of the 
input lines of the gate directly before the output will increase the delay and eventually 
cause a glitch to appear on the output. 
 
Figure 10:  Karnaugh Map for a Simple Glitch Circuit 
B
B
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D
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Figure 11:  Simple Glitch Circuit 
3.2.2. Simulation 
The next step is to simulate the concept to approximate the number of buffers 
needed to cause a delay long enough to produce a glitch.  This step is carried out to get an 
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idea of how many buffers will need to be added to the path.  The results of simulating the 
design will not likely yield a very precise solution, as a lot of researchers have studied 
glitch modeling with commercial software products and have not found an accepted 
method of achieving an accurate simulation, [16-19]. The buffers are added directly 
before one of the input lines to the last NOR gate before the output.  An input 
combination that switches from one maxterm combination to another is used to stimulate 
glitches.  The maxterms of a circuit are the combination of inputs that cause the circuit‟s 
output to equal „0‟.  For example, in Figure 10, the maxterms that are highlighted in blue 
are A‟+B+C and B‟+D‟.  The first simulation run shows that a 1.0311ns glitch can be 
seen at the output of a four input simple logic circuit, see Figure 12.  This pulse width is 
very short and would not likely be detected in actual circuitry due to the setup time of the 
flip flops.   
The next simulations show the pulse width increasing as the number of buffers 
increase.  The addition of four buffers, shown in Figure 13, causes a glitch pulse width of 
3.2260ns, which should be a sufficient amount of time to be able to sense it.  Simulations 
revealed that adding four buffers into the circuit should introduce enough delay into the 
circuit to capture a glitch. 
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Figure 12:  Glitch Circuit Simulation with Zero Buffers 
22 
 
Figure 13:  Glitch Circuit Simulation with Four Buffers 
3.2.3. Implementation 
The implementation of the circuit is the next logical step in the progression.  The 
design is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA, using Xilinx Embedded Development 
Kit (EDK) as the development tool.  The glitch calculations and user applications are 
built using Xilinx Software Development Kit (SDK).  The flow chart depicted in Figure 
14 illustrates the steps required to accomplish the end goal of generating a user-specified 
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key to use in an encryption algorithm.  First, an encryption scheme must be chosen.  
Next, a circuit that generates glitches must be designed.  After this, there must be written 
in C that uses the Power PC on the Virtex-5 to characterize the number of glitches for 
each buffer count.  This information is used to generate the key in the last step. 
 
Figure 14:  Implementation Flow Chart 
3.2.3.1 Implement Encryption Algorithm 
The first step in implementation is to employ the encryption algorithm.  The 
National Security Administration has approved AES as its cryptography standard.  AES 
is capable of using key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits [20].  The Committee on National 
Security Systems authorizes the use of 128 bits for SECRET information [21].  TOP 
SECRET information requires key lengths of 192 and 256 bits.  The AES encryption 
modules, written in VHDL, are provided by a fellow AFIT student, Major William Cobb. 
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3.2.3.2 Construct a Glitch Generator 
The next step is to construct a circuit that generates between zero and one glitches 
for each output line.  The first task in realizing a glitch generator is to make modifications 
to Capt Patel‟s digital fingerprinting code.  The first of these modifications is a new 
intermediate circuit that replaces the multiplier.  The new circuit is capable of generating 
zero or one glitch on each output line.  This glitch circuit is modified from the one used 
in the simulations.  It has three input terms (A, B, and C), and it uses NAND gates instead 
of NOR gates.  One less input term is used to reduce the complexity of the circuit.  
NAND gates are utilized so that the glitch capture code does not need to be modified 
since a NAND circuit will generate 0‟s as glitches, while a NOR implementation will 
generate 1‟s as glitches. Although the circuit is different from the one used in the 
simulations, for the current research purposes, it is essentially the same.  Both the NAND 
and NOR implementations are very simple circuits that are capable of generating 
glitches.  The simulations are only accomplished as an approximation of how many 
buffers it would take to produce a glitch wide enough that it could be captured by a one-
hot state shift register.  Since both circuits use two levels of simple logic gates, and both 
use a similar number of transistors, the delay that buffers introduce into the design should 
be about the same. 
A regular shift register is used in place of the LFSR to make the inputs to the circuit 
known and stable rather than pseudo-random.  The input combination must change only 
once to ensure that no more than one glitch will be induced. 
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Another modification is the utilization of slave registers in the user logic file for the 
inputs to the shift register.  This allows the inputs to be controlled directly from the C 
code, permitting any changes to be made rapidly instead of having to wait for the entire 
design to re-synthesize.  Since the design uses a 64-bit shift register and the slave 
registers are only 32 bits wide, the new design uses 32 bits that are hard-coded into the 
VHDL and the other 32 bits come from the C code.  It is not imperative that all 64 bits 
come from the C code.  Having the ability to change 32 bits of the input provides a 
sufficient amount of flexibility to be able to adapt to any new requirements that may arise 
in the future.  It also provides a longer sequence of the input combination to repeat, which 
allows the circuit time to settle to the correct value if the glitch takes longer than one 
clock cycle to propagate through the circuitry. 
One problem that is present in the original design is that the set and reset 
combination that is given to the input shift registers and the one-hot state shift registers.  
The shift register needs the sequence 0, 1, 1 on the set lines, and the reset sequence 
needed is 0, 0, 1.  The one hot state shift register needs the reset sequence 0, 1.  This 
causes all registers to go to zero, except the least significant bit.  To fix this, „set‟ is now 
connected to the „clear‟ input and „reset‟ is connected to the „load‟ input of the shift 
register.   
The C code, written by Capt Patel, is hard to decipher because is lengthy and hard 
to follow.  To make the code more readable, there are new functions in the code to make 
the program flow easier to understand, including printDF() and setInputSequence().  The 
printDF() function prints the glitch count for each of the 64 output lines of the five glitch 
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units.  It also displays the glitch total for each of the five units.  The setInputSequence() 
function is called at the beginning of the program to provide the proper sequence of 
values to the input shift registers, which hold the inputs A, B, and C to the glitch 
generating circuits.  Theoretically more functions could be added to make the code more 
readable, but the time between setting the values and reading them are critical in a circuit 
that relies on momentary false values.  For example, a function to provide the proper set 
and reset sequence does not result in the same glitch counts on all of the output lines 
because the values change by the time the function returns. 
When running the original main.c file, the glitch count for each output is either „0‟ 
or „2‟.  This is not the expected outcome.  Since the input combination should only 
produce an outcome of „1‟ and only changes once, the only outcomes should be a „0‟ or a 
„1‟.  Upon further investigation, the error is in the portion of the C code that counts the 
glitches by shifting the bits of the one-hot state shift register.  The code shifts the bits of 
the 16-bit counter until the left-most „1‟ reaches the 16
th
 bit position.  The original code 
subtracts the number of shifts it took to get the bit to the 16
th
 position from 16.  This is 
incorrect because if the glitch count is „1‟, that bit originates in the 2
nd
 bit position.  The 
code will shift the bit 14 times to reach the 16
th
 position, and 16-14 = 2.  The code is now 
modified to subtract the number of shifts from 15.  Returning to the previous example 
and using the updated value to subtract from, 15-14 = 1, which is the correct 
interpretation of the glitch count. 
After all of the initial modifications were made to the digital fingerprinting code, 
several other changes were needed to correct Xilinx-specific issues. In the earliest 
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renditions of the Uncloneable Key Generation System, no glitches show up on the output 
lines.  After experimenting with several possible solutions, it is apparent that Xilinx 
optimizes the design by removing the buffers.  This can be determined by examining the 
Device Utilization Summary in the system_xst.srp file.  Since the number of buffers is 
doubled while the amount of resources utilized by the FPGA stays the same, it is clear 
that the design is being optimized by removing unnecessary gates.  Xilinx considers these 
buffers unnecessary circuitry because buffers do not change the final outcome of the 
circuit.  For the purposes of this research, the buffers are used to cause an increase in the 
propagation delay from the input to the output of the simple glitch circuit.  To keep 
Xilinx from removing the buffers, attributes DONT_OPTIMIZE and 
KEEP_HIERARCHY are included in the VHDL file that describes the buffer and the 
glitch circuit file that multiplexes buffers together [22].   
Another issue inherent in the VHDL code was discovered when glitch counts on all 
outputs were 1‟s.  At this time, buffers were only added to the path of the top input to the 
second level NAND gate.  The problem arises due to the difference in the delay induced 
by the multiplexed buffer unit as compared to a wire.  Even with no buffers added to the 
path, the delay is long due to the multiplexers on one wire.  At the time of the discovery, 
there were nine multiplexers on each path, which adds a significant amount of delay to 
each output line.  This issue is resolved by adding the capability to add buffers to both the 
top and bottom input of the second level NAND gate as depicted in Figure 15 for the 
linear selection implementation and in Figure 16 for the cascaded buffer design. 
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Figure 15:  Glitch Circuit with Linear Buffer Selection on Both Inputs to NAND 
Gate 
 
 
Figure 16:  Glitch Circuit with Cascaded Buffer Selection on Both Inputs 
Another realization that an initial assumption was incorrect occurred when glitch 
counts did not strictly increase or decrease when increasing the number of buffers on a 
circuit path.  Instead, glitch counts are random when buffer counts on one path are 
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increased.  This is a result of how the components are wired together.  Xilinx EDK 
assigns random wiring paths between all components in the design.  Although, 
theoretically, two components are next to each other, Xilinx may not put an efficient, 
short, straight path between them.  It may take an inefficient, long, winding path to the 
next component.  The placement of components and wiring paths are random.  After 
analyzing the data, it could be ascertained exactly which paths were causing delays in the 
output.  These paths were ones both with and without buffers between multiplexers.   
The location and/or content of some xil_printf statements cause the program to halt 
execution prematurely, print random ASCII characters, or fail to begin execution.  
Similar problems can occur when removing an unused variable or not initializing the 
unused variable.   
3.2.3.3 Design a Procedure to Profile the Circuit 
The third step in the implementation flowchart is to create a procedure to profile the 
circuit.  Profiling the circuit is simply generating glitch counts for all quantities of buffers 
and recording the results.  The data collected during profiling is for the user to determine 
if an output line is usable, and what glitch count is achieved by inserting a particular 
number of buffers into a glitch circuit path.  An output line is considered unusable or 
“bad” if the same glitch count is achieved for all quantities of buffers inserted into the 
upper and lower input of the final NAND gate of the glitch generation circuit.  Several 
issues materialized while working on this part of the application. 
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It is a known fact that temperature affects transistor characteristics.  The 
temperature of the surrounding environment is a macroscopic example of heat that affects 
the circuitry.  For this research, all measurements were taken at room temperature to 
ensure that the ambient air temperature did not affect the output.  Another, less obvious 
issue involving heat is the effect of executing the C code.  Running the C code causes 
currents to travel through the FPGA, which generates heat within the circuit.  The glitch 
counts tend to be different the first time the code is executed after a period of rest.  To 
stabilize the glitch count, the glitch counting portion of the code is run through five 
iterations before displaying the glitch counts.  This is controlled by a for loop with the 
variable “itr”, which is short for iteration. 
Another repercussion of heat in the design deals with the print statements.  
Changing the location of xil_printf statements in main.c causes the glitch counts to vary.  
The glitch units that are placed close to the Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) and 
Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) interfaces stay hotter, while the 
units that are farther from those components cool off while print statements execute.  
Print statements are necessary, and they cannot always wait until after the code is 
finished running, therefore the solution is to be cognizant of the issue.  The full C code 
must not be changed in between profiling the circuit and generating the key.  Also, the 
print statements within the portions of code that initiate glitches and read the glitch count 
must be the same in both the profile and key generation methods to avoid getting 
contrasting glitch counts. 
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3.2.3.4 Develop a Method for the User to Select a Location of the Bits of the Key 
The last step of implementation is to generate the key.  The result of profiling the 
circuit in the previous step is used to generate the correct key.  The data collected reports 
the glitch count for each output line, for every quantity of buffer available.  The user can 
then determine which outputs not to use, as well as the buffer count and output to choose 
for each bit of the key they would like to generate.  For example, if a user wanted to 
generate „1‟, they would look at the profiling results and find the buffer quantity on a 
usable output line of a particular circuit that gave a glitch count of „1‟.  These three pieces 
of information are entered into the key generation portion of the code for each bit of the 
128-bit AES encryption key.  The key generation code is executed in C, and is very 
similar to the profile portion of the C code, except that there is a user entry loop that asks 
the user for a circuit number, an output line, and the number of buffers to insert into the 
glitch circuit. 
3.3. System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT), illustrated in Figure 17, is the Uncloneable Key 
Generation System, consisting of three 64-bit shift registers, intermediate circuits, and 64 
one-hot state shift registers.  Each of the 64-bit wide shift registers serves as an input line 
of the intermediate circuitry.  There are three shift registers for each glitch circuit, each 
holds an input (A, B, or C) that is fed to the glitch circuit.  They provide an input pattern 
that shifts one bit into the circuit on every clock cycle.  There are 64 intermediate circuits.  
Each one generates glitches for a single output line.  The glitches are recorded by the 16-
bit one-hot state shift registers.   
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Figure 17:  System Under Test (SUT) 
 A 16-bit one-hot state shift register is a register that contains all zeros except for 
one register, which is the “hot”, or active, state.  The clock line of each one-hot shift 
register is tied to an output line of the combinational logic circuit.  Each time a glitch 
occurs, it moves one position over in the register.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 18.  
The final position of the one in the register reveals the total number of glitches that 
occurred on the output line. 
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Figure 18:  16-bit One-hot State Shift Register 
The Component Under Test (CUT) is the combinational circuit that generates 
glitches on the output lines.  This component is comprised of 64 independent circuits.   
Each one is a 2-level NAND circuit that combines two minterms.  Minterms are similar 
to maxterms, explained in section 3.2.2, except that minterms are the combinations of 
inputs that cause the output to evaluate to a „1‟.  The output of the first level is connected 
to a selectable number of buffers.  These buffers are inserted to induce glitches to appear 
on the output lines.  The output of the buffers is wired to the second level NAND gate, 
whose output goes to the clock line of a one-hot state shift register to capture the glitches 
produced by the previous component.  The exact configuration of the buffers in the 
intermediate circuitry is assessed in this research.   
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3.4. System Services 
The Digital Fingerprinting System provides a unique identifier for an electronic 
circuit.  The system must be able to produce varying glitch counts when adding different 
numbers of buffers into the circuit path.  The output of the system is composed of five 
glitch units, each with 64 output lines, for a total of (64 x 5) = 320 possible output lines.  
The user can select 128 of the outputs to use as a key input to the AES encryption 
algorithm. 
In previous experiments [3], the distinguishability and stability are evaluated.  The 
distinguishability is the measure of how well the digital fingerprinting method is able to 
generate a unique glitch count for a large amount of electronic circuits.  The stability is a 
measure of the method‟s ability to reproduce the same glitch count for the same circuit on 
multiple runs.  Given that the Digital Fingerprint System has already proven to deliver a 
unique glitch count for different FPGAs, the system should not have a problem with 
distinguishability.  Stability, on the other hand, is more of a concern.  The stability of the 
glitch count is the primary service that the system provides.   
3.5. Workload 
The workload of the Digital Fingerprinting System is the input bit combination that 
is loaded into the shift registers initially.  The NAND glitch circuit produces a „1‟ on its 
output on minterms one, three, six, and seven.  The current implementation begins with 
minterm seven, followed by minterm three.  This input combination will cause some 
outputs to produce glitches as it switches from one input to the next. 
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3.6. Performance Metrics  
3.6.1. Size of the circuit 
Keeping the size of the circuit as small as possible is important.  The end 
application of this device will make it infeasible if it is too large.  The original digital 
fingerprinting code used almost the entire design space on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro.  The 
smaller the footprint of the key generation hardware, the more useful it will be to a user. 
3.6.2. Number of usable output lines 
The number of usable output lines is an important measure to take into account.  If 
the design is to be kept as small as possible, there should be as few wasted lines as 
possible.  A usable line is one that has at least one „0‟ and one „1‟ glitch for all possible 
numbers of buffers.  If an output line doesn‟t have at least one of each glitch count, it is 
considered unusable because there is no way for the user to specify the output on that 
line. 
3.6.3. Stability 
The internal stability of the output line glitch counts, as outlined by Patel in [3], is 
ascertained by taking multiple readings of the glitch count on each output line and 
determining how many times the glitch count varied over those readings.  Each time the 
DF algorithm is initiated, each output line is sampled 100 times in a row.  A running total 
of the glitch count is kept for each output line.  If the total glitch count is not 0 or 100, 
that output line is not completely stable.  Since keys must be stable, any buffer count that 
causes an output line to be less than 100% stable should not be used.   
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3.6.4. Distinguishability 
The distinguishability of a circuit that is used to generate an uncloneable key 
should be very high.  In this case, distinguishability determines the likelihood of an ID 
collision.  Suh describes the probability of an ID collision in [4].  An ID with X bits has 
the possibility of producing 2
X
 distinct IDs.  This modified DF method contains five DF 
units, each with 64 output lines.  The total number of available outputs is (64 x 5) = 320, 
so the number of possible IDs is 2.14 x 10
96
.  In the following equation, Y represents the 
total population of chips, n represents the nth chip, and X is the number of bits in the ID. 
 
If Y is set to 1,000,000 and X is 2.14 x 10
96
, the theoretical possibility of a collision 
is virtually zero.  The modified DF algorithm will be run on five Virtex-5 boards to 
establish distinguishability among a small sample of circuits. 
3.7. System Parameters 
3.7.1. Number of buffer SELECT bits 
The number of buffer select bits determines the total number of buffers that can be 
inserted into the path on each output line.  The linear selection implementation is capable 
of inserting up to 2
B
 buffers, when B is equal to the number SELECT bits.  The cascading 
design is theoretically capable of placing any number or buffers on the path, since the 
only requirement is that as the SELECT bit combination increases, so does the number of 
buffers.  If B is the number of SELECT bits, the design will have 2
B
 different choices for 
(1) 
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the number of buffers inserted.  The number of buffers in between each cascaded level 
can be any number.  The design implemented in this research allows the user to choose 
between eight different buffer amounts depicted in Table 2 (0, 1, 17, 22, 27, 47, 49, and 
63), using three SELECT bits. 
3.7.2. Configuration of selectable buffers 
There are a multitude of different possible ways to configure the buffers in a way 
that makes them selectable to the user.  This research tests two configurations for adding 
a selectable number of buffers to the circuit to induce glitch generation.  The first design 
allows the user to select the number of buffers by using binary bits.  A multiplexer for 
each bit selects whether the buffers between it and the multiplexer before it are used.  An 
illustration of this concept using four buffer SELECT bits can be seen in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19:  Linear Buffer Selection Using a Multiplexer for Each Binary Bit 
 
The second design tested, shown in Figure 20, is one that cascades buffers 
together to insert different buffer totals into each line of one multiplexer.  The cascading 
buffer selection design is an attempt to reduce the delay that is introduced by adding 
multiple multiplexers in series.  The linear multiplexing circuit was analyzed to figure out 
what number of buffers produced the most usable output lines as described in Section 
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3.6.2.  The results of the analysis of the first glitch unit are detailed in Table 1.  The other 
four glitch units show similar results. 
 
Figure 20: Buffer Selection Using a Multiplexer and Cascading Buffers 
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Table 1:  Analysis of Usable Output Lines for Cascading Buffer Design 
 
0 1 22 47 63 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 22 47 63 100's 0's
0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 7 2 T
1 0 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 5 4 T
2 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 4 5 T
3 0 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 6 3 T
4 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
5 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 8 1 T
6 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
7 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 7 2 T
8 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 7 2 T
9 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
10 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 7 2 T
11 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
12 0 0 100 18 100 100 100 100 100 6 2 T
13 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
14 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 6 3 T
15 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
16 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3 6 T
17 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 8 1 T
18 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 2 7 T
19 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
20 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
21 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 6 3 T
22 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
23 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 1 8 T
24 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3 6 T
25 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3 6 T
26 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3 6 T
27 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3 6 T
28 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
29 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
30 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 4 5 T
31 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 5 4 T
32 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
33 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 8 1 T
34 0 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 6 3 T
35 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 100 6 3 T
36 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 2 7 T
37 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 7 2 T
38 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
39 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
40 100 100 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 6 3 T
41 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 7 2 T
42 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 7 2 T
43 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 6 3 T
44 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 5 4 T
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 2 7 T
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 3 6 T
47 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 8 1 T
48 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 5 4 T
49 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 2 7 T
50 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 4 5 T
51 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 5 4 T
52 100 100 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 6 3 T
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 1 8 T
54 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 5 4 T
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 2 7 T
56 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 7 2 T
57 100 100 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 6 3 T
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 3 6 T
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 1 8 T
T' if row has 
a 100 & a 0
# of:
O
ut
pu
t 
Li
ne
 #
Top Buffer Count:
Bottom Buffer Count:
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3.8. Factors 
3.8.1. Number of buffer select bits 
The number of bits to select the amount of buffers used will be minimized to ensure 
that the entire design is as small as possible.  The design is implemented with 3, 4, and 6 
buffer SELECT bits.  When using the multiplexed linear selection implementation, the 
maximum number of buffers on each line is equal to 2
B-1
, where B represents the number 
of SELECT bits.  Maximum buffer counts of 7, 15, and 63 are examined when studying 
the linear selection implementation.  Each design is capable of choosing between zero 
and the maximum number of buffers since it uses binary selection. 
The cascading multiplexer uses three selection bits to choose eight different buffer 
counts.  The buffer counts for this design are shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2:  Number of Buffers Chosen According to SELECT bits 
2 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 17
0 1 1 22
1 0 0 27
1 0 1 47
1 1 0 49
1 1 1 63
SELECT bits # of 
buffers
 
3.8.2. Configuration of buffers 
The configuration of the buffers is investigated to determine the most effective method 
to generate at least one of each of the two main glitch counts, „0‟ or „1‟.  One 
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configuration is the linear selection implementation, where each bit position of the 
SELECT line corresponds to the number of buffers that is placed in the circuit.   
The other circuit is designed to use the previous input to the multiplexer, with a 
specific number of buffers added to the path into the multiplexer.  This is useful if 
certain, nonlinear buffer counts prove to be the best way to increase the delay on a path. 
3.9. Evaluation Technique 
The Digital Fingerprinting System will be evaluated via the measurement of a real 
system.  Some preliminary studies will use simulation to deduce an appropriate starting 
point, but the vast majority of experiments will require measuring the outcome of the 
actual system.  Results are taken using the linear selection design with 7, 15, and 63 
maximum specifiable buffers on each line, and from eight different buffer counts (0, 1, 
17, 22, 27, 47, 49, and 63). 
The experimental configuration consists of 64, 64-bit shift registers for each of the 
three inputs to the circuit (A, B, and C), 64 simple combinational logic circuits, and 64 
16-bit one-hot state shift registers to record the glitches on each output line. 
The inputs A, B, and C will use minterm seven followed by minterm three.  Each 
minterm is repeated 32 times to fill up the shift register. The shift registers are kept 64 
bits wide so that the design could easily be adapted to produce more glitches, it gives the 
output adequate time to change, and it is simpler to leave the design the way it is.   
The combinational logic circuit is a simple 2-level logic circuit that combines two 
terms.  The main circuit uses three NAND gates and an inverter.  The selectable buffer 
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units use buffers and multiplexer(s), and are placed before the second level NAND gate 
on both its top and bottom inputs.   
Each glitch circuit is connected to the clock line of a one-hot state shift register.  
The most significant bit of each of the registers is initially set to „1‟, signifying the hot 
state.  Each glitch acts like a clock pulse and causes the hot state to move one position 
toward the least significant bit.  At the end of the simulation, the position of the one in the 
shift register determines how many glitches occurred. 
3.10. Experimental Design 
The number of simulations run to determine the simulation method has been 
successful is based on experiments and justification by Patel [3] since a full factorial, or 
even partial factorial number of simulations on several factors over the thousands of 
transistors in a multiplier circuit would be too time consuming.  Patel uses the following 
equation to compute the confidence interval of his experimental method where zα/2 is 
1.96, determined by a normal distribution table. 
d = ± zα/2 [p(1-p)/n]
1/2
 
The p represents the probability estimate.  If all of the circuits were able to be 
uniquely identified, p would be 100%, which cannot be used in the above equation; 
therefore p = (n-1)/n, where n is the sample size, which is chosen as 25 since there are 
five Virtex-5 boards available, and the project instantiates five complete glitch units.  
With these numbers, if each circuit has a unique ID, there is 95% confidence that 96% ± 
(2) 
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7.68% of all circuits will have a unique identity when evaluated by this simulation 
method. 
3.11. Methodology Summary 
The number of buffer SELECT lines and configuration of buffers is varied to 
deduce the most reliable and efficient means of producing at least one „0‟ and one „1‟ on 
each output line.  Once the best configuration of these factors and levels is determined, 
this project provides an interface that allows a user to profile the design to determine 
if/which output lines are unusable.  The user then selects the number of buffers to use for 
each line to generate a key, which is fed into the AES encryption algorithm as its key.  
The result is an uncloneable key generated according to user specifications.  
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IV. Results 
4.1. Analysis of the Configuration of the Buffers  
Two configurations of the buffer selection are presented in the following section.  
The first is the linear selection of buffers, which is capable of placing between zero and 
seven buffers on the top or bottom input to the second NAND gate.  The second 
configuration implements a cascading buffer design that has eight choices for the number 
of buffers placed on the path, utilizing between 0 and 63 buffers.   
At least one buffer selection unit is always held to 0 while the other increases.  This 
is done to keep the number of evaluations at a reasonable number, especially when 
testing designs that have more than eight choices of buffers.   
Each output line is evaluated for every combination of buffers tested in this 
experiment.  An output is considered “bad” if for all numbers of buffers, the same 
number of glitches is produced.  The output line is unusable when all combinations 
produce the same glitch count because each line must have a choice of a „0‟ or a „1‟ to 
generate a bit of the key.  There are five glitch units implemented on the Virtex-5 board, 
and each unit has 64 outputs.  Thus, there are (5 x 64) = 320 total output lines tested in 
each design. 
4.1.1. Linear Buffer Selection 
Figure 15 shows the glitch circuit when configured with linear buffer selection.  
The buffer count is selected using the binary number representing the number of buffers 
desired.  There are 15 total choices; 0 on top and bottom, 1 to 7 on the top, and 1 to 7 on 
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the bottom.  Testing reveals that 99 out of 320 total output lines, or 30.94%, are unusable.  
Each unit had between 16 and 27 “bad” outputs.  A representative sampling of the results 
is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Analysis of Linear Selection With Up to 7 Buffers 
 
4.1.2. Cascading Buffer Selection 
The circuit in Figure 16 illustrates the cascading buffer selection design.  There are 
eight buffer selection choices on the top and bottom.  They are 0, 1, 17, 22, 27, 47, 49, or 
63.  This is selectable using three SELECT bits.  Table 2 explains the selection choices 
for this design.  Each of the five units had between 31 and 38 unusable output lines.  172 
or 53.75% of the outputs are “bad”.  A portion of the analysis is displayed in Table 4 
below. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 98
1 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100
2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 bad
3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 bad
4 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
5 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
6 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 0
8 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
11 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
12 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
O
u
tp
u
t 
Li
n
e
 #
Top Buffer Count:
Bottom Buffer Count:
Output Line
Bad?
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Table 4:  Analysis of Cascaded Selection With 8 Choices and Up to 63 Buffers 
 
4.1.1. Summary of Results of Selection Configuration 
The results of testing the buffer selection configuration demonstrate that the linear 
selection implementation produces less “bad” output lines.  The linear selection method 
generates 14.79% more usable outputs.  The next set of tests use this buffer selection 
configuration to find the optimum number of SELECT bits to implement in this design. 
4.2. Analysis of the Number of SELECT bits 
The previous section discusses the results of testing the buffer configuration.  The 
linear selection design is clearly a better choice, as it outperforms its competitor by 
14.79%.  The following analysis determines the optimal number of buffers to insert into 
the logic circuit path by comparing the use of three, four, and six bits.  As discussed in 
the buffer configuration analysis, the following analysis will consider an output line 
“bad” if all tested combinations of buffers generate the same number of glitches for that 
particular output. 
0 1 17 22 27 47 49 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17 22 27 47 49 63
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 0
2 100 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
3 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 bad
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
8 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
10 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
12 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 bad
O
u
tp
u
t 
Li
n
e
 #
Top Buffer Count:
Bottom Buffer Count:
Output 
Line
Bad?
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4.2.1. Three SELECT bits 
The results of tests using three SELECT bits in the linear buffer selection 
configuration are presented in Table 3.  30.94% of the output lines are considered usable. 
4.2.2. Four SELECT bits 
A sample of the results of using four SELECT bits in the linear buffer selection 
implementation is portrayed in Table 5.  The table lists only the outcome of adding 
buffers into the bottom circuit path.  Approximately 1 out of every 16 output lines is 
considered unusable.  This constitutes 6.25% of all possible outputs being characterized 
as “bad”. 
Table 5:  Analysis of Linear Selection With Up to 15 Buffers 
 
4.2.3. Six SELECT bits 
The results of testing the use of six SELECT bits reveal that 1.56% of all output 
lines are unusable.  A representative selection of these results is depicted in Table 6.  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
1 100 5 100 100 100 100 100 90 100 2 100 100 100 100 100
2 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100
3 0 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 100
4 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100
5 0 0 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 80 100
6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
7 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100
8 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
10 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
11 100 97 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 bad
Top Buffer Count: Output Line
Bad?Bottom Buffer Count:
O
u
tp
u
t 
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n
e
 #
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Since there are 127 tested buffer counts, there are too many to show even a complete set 
of buffer counts, so a set of 12 consecutive counts are depicted in Table 6. 
Table 6:  Analysis of Linear Selection With Up to 63 Buffers 
 
4.2.1. Summary of the Analysis of the Number of SELECT bits 
The percent of unusable output lines is 30.94%, 6.25%, and 1.56% corresponding 
to three, four, and six SELECT bits respectively.  The number of usable outputs increases 
by 24.69% when going from three to four bits, which implements twice as many buffers.  
When increasing the number of SELECT bits from four to six, only a gain of 4.69% in 
good outputs is seen by quadrupling the amount of logic gates.  
The optimum implementation depends on how important space is, and also how 
many usable output lines are needed by the user.  Each additional SELECT bit increases 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 105 21 T
1 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 102 26 T
2 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 111 16 T
3 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 97 31 T
4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 104 24 T
5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 16 T
6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 108 20 T
7 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 92 32 T
8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 30 T
9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 29 T
10 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 82 46 T
11 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 116 12 T
12 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 85 41 T
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 63 T
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 64 T
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 96 T
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 56 T
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 108 T
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 107 T
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 56 T
20 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 91 36 T
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 72 T
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 FALSE
O
u
tp
u
t 
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n
e
 #
Top Buffer Count:
Bottom Buffer Count:
# 100's # 0's
IF at least 1 "0" 
and 1 "100"
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the number of logic gates by a power of two.  The increase in logic needed by six bits as 
opposed to four bits is not an efficient use of space; however, the increase from three to 
four bits increases the total usable lines by almost 25%.  The optimal choice for most 
users would likely be the four bit design.  This would create approximately 300 output 
lines to use in generating a key, which would give 172 unused output lines after using 
128 of them for a key.  This gives the user more than double the amount of required bits 
for a key.  It would also make it even more difficult for an adversary to be able to 
replicate the key since they would have to guess the correct bits and from which outputs 
those bits were taken. 
4.3. Analysis of Key Generation  
The analysis of the key generation includes testing the implementation, stability 
and the distinguishability of the glitch counts on each output line.  The implementation 
tests the success or failure of implementing the AES algorithm.  The key for AES is taken 
from the outputs of the glitch units.  The stability of the glitches is a measure of how 
repeatable after the counts are each successive time the profiling algorithm is run.  The 
glitch counts must be the same every time the code is executed in order to generate the 
same key.  The distinguishability of the Uncloneable Key Generation System guarantees 
that the glitch counts are unique when the same code is run on another board.   
4.3.1. Implementation of AES 
Each of output line of a glitch unit corresponds to a simple glitch circuit.  There are 
64 glitch circuits comprising a glitch unit.  The Uncloneable Key Generation System is 
composed of five glitch units.  This creates a total of 320 output lines to specify a bit of 
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the AES key.  This overabundance of outputs is created to compensate for some output 
lines to be unusable and also makes it more difficult for an adversary to guess the key.   
The result of the combination of these two entities for creating a key for AES 
encryption is a success.  The Uncloneable Key Generation System operates at 
125.00MHz.  The user must first profile each output of the five glitch units and record the 
value of the glitch count on each of the 320 output lines at all buffer counts.  This 
information is used to specify each bit of the key.  To generate a bit of a particular key, 
the user must find an output line that is usable (has at least one „0‟ and one „1‟ glitch 
count at one of the buffer counts), then enter the glitch unit number, output line number, 
and the number of buffers that will produce the necessary bit value. 
A picture showing the layout of five glitch units on a Virtex-5 board is shown in 
Figure 21, and the corresponding Device Utilization Summary is depicted in 
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Figure 22.  The layout of the Uncloneable Key Generation System is a combination 
of five glitch units and an AES module for encryption.  The AES module uses 
approximately the same amount of resources as all five glitch units combined, which is 
clearly shown in Figure 23.  As a result, the instantiation of the Uncloneable Key 
Generation System consumes slightly more than double the amount of resources as the 
five glitch units.  Figure 24 displays the Device Utilization Summary for the Uncloneable 
Key Generation System.   
 
Figure 21:  Layout of Five Glitch Units 
52 
 
Figure 22:  Device Utilization Summary of Five Glitch Units 
 
Figure 23:  Layout of Uncloneable Key Generation System 
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Figure 24:  Device Utilization Summary of Uncloneable Key Generation System 
4.3.2. Stability 
Stability tests confirm that the glitch counts for each output line for a Virtex-5 
FPGA are the same each time the C code is executed.  Preliminary testing showed that 
temperature is a pertinent factor in returning stable glitch counts.  The time between print 
statements and memory access executions change the heat generated within the circuit.  
The code that generates and records glitch counts must be nearly identical to ensure that 
the glitch count will stay the same when the circuits are profiled and during the 
generation of the key. 
After profiling each of the five units instantiated on five different Virtex-5 boards, 
results show that stability of each unit varies from 88.06% to 99.68%.  The outcome of 
the stability tests for each unit is displayed in Table 7.  The average stability over all 25 
units is 94.85% with a standard deviation of 2.77%. 
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Table 7:  Percent Stability for Each Glitch Unit 
 
4.3.3. Distinguishability 
The distinguishability tests on this method are accomplished in order to measure 
the degree to which one unit differs from another one generated on a different FPGA.  
Each glitch unit has 64 output lines that generate a binary bit.  There are five glitch units 
(A, B, C, D, and E) instantiated on each of the five Virtex-5 FPGAs.  The placement and 
routing of each unit is identical, therefore, the distinguishability between each location A, 
B, C, D, and E will be evaluated against its matching unit on the other boards at each 
1 1 289 93.23%
1 2 300 96.77%
1 3 309 99.68%
1 4 301 97.10%
1 5 289 93.23%
2 1 275 88.71%
2 2 289 93.23%
2 3 299 96.45%
2 4 294 94.84%
2 5 284 91.61%
3 1 273 88.06%
3 2 293 94.52%
3 3 296 95.48%
3 4 298 96.13%
3 5 289 93.23%
4 1 288 92.90%
4 2 290 93.55%
4 3 294 94.84%
4 4 296 95.48%
4 5 299 96.45%
5 1 302 97.42%
5 2 303 97.74%
5 3 295 95.16%
5 4 306 98.71%
5 5 300 96.77%
Board Unit
# Repeated
Glitch Count
Average
Stability
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buffer count.   Essentially, the distinguishability of the location of each output line for 
each number of buffers is evaluated.  There are 25 total units under test.  Each unit is 
given a letter and number identifier.  For example, the glitch unit A on board 1 is called 
A1, and unit A on board 2 uses the identifier A2, and so on.  Units A1, A2, A3, A4, and 
A5 are compared against each other for each output line of each buffer quantity.  The 
same is true for units B, C, D, and E.  For each output line of a unit with the same letter 
identifier, there are ten comparisons.  Each of the ten comparisons is summed over the 64 
output locations to determine the Hamming distance between each pair of units at the 
same location.  This determines the number of distinct output lines at the same location at 
a specific buffer count.   
The number of distinct output lines between each pair of boards is summed for 
each buffer count.  A sample of the glitch count of all location A comparisons is shown in 
Table 8 for location A on each of the five boards.  The figure does not show all 64 output 
lines.   
The average distinguishability over each of the ten pair-wise comparisons at each 
buffer quantity is recorded.  A sample of the sum of the ten pair-wise comparisons at 
buffer quantity=0 is displayed in Table 9.  There are 31 different buffer counts, consisting 
of 0 buffers on both the top and bottom circuit paths, 1 to 15 buffers on top while holding 
the bottom at 0, and 1 to 15 on the bottom while holding the top at 0.  These 31 averages, 
one for each buffer count, are averaged together to determine the overall 
distinguishability of the Uncloneable Key Generation System. 
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Table 8:  Distinguishability Sample for Location A Comparisons 
 
Table 9:  Sample of Average Number of Distinct Outputs at Buffer Count = 0 
 
Table 10 displays a summary of the results of distinguishability tests.  The table 
shows the average number and percentage of distinct outputs out of the five matching 
units A, B, C, D, and E for a given buffer count.  The overall distinguishability is 
10.46%.  The standard deviation is 4.41%. 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A1_A2 A1_A3 A1_A4 A1_A5 A2_A3 A2_A4 A2_A5 A3_A4 A3_A5 A4_A5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Location A Same Location, Different Board Comparison
Sum of Distinct Outputs
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1_2 1_3 1_4 1_5 2_3 2_4 2_5 3_4 3_5 4_5
Number of distinct outputs 13 10 6 6 19 17 13 6 12 8 11
Percentage of distinct outputs 20.31% 15.63% 9.38% 9.38% 29.69% 26.56% 20.31% 9.38% 18.75% 12.50% 17.19%
Hamming Distance Between 2 Units for 64 all Output Lines Avg Distinct 
Outputs
Buffer Count = 0
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Table 10:  Distinguishability Results 
 
4.4. Results Summary 
This chapter describes the results of testing the configuration of the selectable 
buffers, the number of SELECT bits used on the selectable buffer unit, and the analysis 
of the stability and distinguishability of this method‟s key generation capabilities. 
0 11 17.19%
1 7.8 12.19%
2 10.2 15.94%
3 7.6 11.88%
4 10.2 15.94%
5 5.8 9.06%
6 10 15.63%
7 3.2 5.00%
8 10.6 16.56%
9 7.1 11.09%
10 7.6 11.88%
11 7.4 11.56%
12 8 12.50%
13 4.4 6.88%
14 8.4 13.13%
15 3.4 5.31%
16 5 7.81%
17 10 15.63%
18 6.6 10.31%
19 5.8 9.06%
20 2.6 4.06%
21 7 10.94%
22 1.4 2.19%
23 9.4 14.69%
24 6.4 10.00%
25 9.8 15.31%
26 4 6.25%
27 5.6 8.75%
28 1.2 1.88%
29 7.4 11.56%
30 2.6 4.06%
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
B
u
ff
e
rs
Avg # of 
Distinct 
Outputs
Avg % of 
Distinct 
Outputs
Average Overall 
Distinguishability 6.6935 10.46%
58 
Two configurations for the buffer selection module were tested.  The linear buffer 
selection design inserts a quantity of buffers equal to the binary equivalent of the number 
on the SELECT line.  The cascaded design inserts one of eight different quantities of 
buffers (0, 1, 17, 22, 27, 47, 49, or 63) into the glitch circuit path.  Tests show that the 
linear configuration is capable of producing 14.79% more usable output lines than the 
cascaded design. 
The linear buffer selection configuration is used to test the use of three, four, and 
six bits on the SELECT input line.   Results demonstrate that as the number of SELECT 
bits increase, so do the number of usable outputs.  Four bits give nearly a 25% 
improvement over three bits, while six bits give less than a 5% gain over the use of four 
bits. 
The implementation of AES using the modified digital fingerprint method is fully 
operational.  The user can specify each bit of the 128-bit key by entering a glitch unit 
number, the output line number, and the number of buffers to insert into the glitch circuit 
path. 
The key generation analysis details the results of testing the stability and 
distinguishability of generating a secure, uncloneable key.  Stability tests confirm that the 
glitch count for each of the 25 units can be repeated with an average probability of 
94.85%.  The tests on the distinguishability of the output lines show that the glitch counts 
are distinct 10.46% of the time when comparing the five units to its matching unit on the 
other FPGAs at the same buffer count.  
59 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In the previous chapter, the results of experimenting on the buffer configuration 
and number of buffer SELECT bits were presented, as well as the stability and 
distinguishability test results of key generation using the modified Digital Fingerprinting 
Method with AES encryption.  This chapter details the conclusions reached due to these 
results. 
5.1. Buffer Configuration Conclusion 
In this research study, two methods of choosing the number of buffers inserted into 
a logic path are investigated.   These designs are evaluated based solely on the number of 
usable output lines that are produced when using three buffer SELECT bits, which 
equates to eight different choices for the total amount of buffers on a wire.  The linear 
buffer selection configuration created 22.81% more usable outputs than the cascaded 
circuit. 
The optimal configuration of buffers uses linear buffer selection with four bits, 
which select between 0 and 15 buffers.  Four bits generate close to a 25% gain in usable 
outputs as compared to using three bits.  Employing six bits rather than four bits provides 
less than a 5% increase in usable output lines. 
5.2. Key Generation Conclusion 
The stability, or repeatability, of the glitch counts taken on the same board are very 
stable, with close to 95% of the counts being repeatable over 10 runs.  The 
distinguishability of the glitch counts is slightly over 10%. 
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5.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
5.3.1. Force routing to be more efficient in Xilinx 
The routing delays between design components cause the output glitch counts to be 
unpredictable.  Future work in this area could investigate a way to force Xilinx to use an 
efficient method of wiring adjacent modules together.  One option would be to find a way 
to manually place and route individual components. 
5.3.2. AES Decryption 
This research effort implements only the encryption portion of the AES algorithm.  
It is only a proof of concept that using the basic ideas behind the Digital Fingerprinting 
method can be used to generate a secure uncloneable key.  Implementing the decryption 
part of AES will provide a complete encryption system to send and receive sensitive 
information. 
5.3.3. Make Uncloneable Key Generation System More Efficient 
There are several modifications that can be made to the existing Uncloneable Key 
Generation System to make it more efficient.  In an actual implementation of this system, 
the space used by the design should be minimized as much as possible.  Currently, the 
number of usable output lines far exceeds the amount needed to produce a key.  One 
overall method of decreasing space is to reduce either the number of SELECT bits or the 
number of glitch units instantiated in VHDL.   
Another way to utilize less hardware space is to reduce the width of the input shift 
registers.  Only two bit combinations are used to generate glitches, while each input shift 
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register is 64 bits long.  It would save a significant amount of space to reduce the three 
input shift registers on all 64 input lines of the five glitch circuits from 64 to 2. 
5.4. Conclusions Summary 
The optimal configuration of buffers uses linear selection with four SELECT bits, 
which insert between 0 and 15 buffers on a delay path.  Test results show that key 
generation reliably provides a stable and distinguishable key for AES encryption.  The 
Uncloneable Key Generation System can also be used as a new way to generate a DF. 
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